When Nash Meets Stackelberg by Carvalho, Margarida et al.
When Nash meets Stackelberg
Margarida Carvalho1,2, Gabriele Dragotto2, Felipe Feijoo3,
Andrea Lodi2, and Sriram Sankaranarayanan2
1 Universite´ de Montre´al carvalho@iro.umontreal.ca
2 CERC Data Science, Polytechnique Montre´al
{gabriele.dragotto, andrea.lodi, sriram.sankaranarayanan}@polymtl.ca
3 Pontifica Universidad Cato´lica de Valpara´ıso felipe.feijoo@pucv.cl
Abstract. Motivated by international energy trade between countries
with profit-maximizing domestic producers, we analyze Nash games played
among leaders of Stackelberg games (NASP). We prove it is both Σp2 -
hard to decide if the game has a pure-strategy (PNE) or a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium (MNE). We then provide a finite algorithm that com-
putes exact MNEs for NASPs when there is at least one, or returns a
certificate if no MNE exists. To enhance computational speed, we in-
troduce an inner approximation hierarchy that increasingly grows the
description of each Stackelberg leader feasible region. Furthermore, we
extend the algorithmic framework to specifically retrieve a PNE if one
exists. Finally, we provide computational tests on a range of NASPs
instances inspired by international energy trades.
Keywords: Game Theory, Algorithmic Game Theory, Stackelberg Game,
Nash Game, Equilibrium Problems with Equilibrium Constraints, Mixed
Integer Programming
1 Games, definitions, and overview
Game theoretical frameworks model complex interactions among agents, and are
widely employed for real-world applications. Their effectiveness relies on two key
ingredients. First, their modeling capabilities with respect to the specific field of
application, along with the ease of interpretability of such models. Secondly, the
power and efficiency of the underlying algorithmic arsenal available to solve these
models. In this paper, we study a class of non-cooperative, simultaneous games
between the leaders (i.e., the first-level players) of bilevel programs with an op-
timistic followers’ response. In other words, the leaders of Stackelberg games
are playing a Nash game among themselves with complete information. We call
such problems Nash Games among Stackelberg Leaders ( NASPs), schematically
represented in Figure 1. NASPs are part of the well-known family of equilibrium
problems with equilibrium constraints ( EPECs), which has a rich variety of appli-
cations in energy markets. A concise representation of an elementary (or trivial,
as more formally defined in Definition 7) NASP between a Latin Stackelberg
game and a Greek Stackelberg game is given by
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Fig. 1: A schematic representation of a NASP . The vertical arrows are Stackel-
berg interactions (i.e, sequential decisions), while the horizontal ones are Nash
interactions (i.e, simultaneous decisions).
Latin Leader
min
x,y
: cTx+ dT y +
(
G
(
ξ
χ
))T (
x
y
)
(1a)
subject to Ax+By ≤ b (1b)
y ∈ arg min
y
{
fT y : Qy ≤ g − Px} (1c)
Greek Leader
min
ξ,χ
: αT ξ + βTχ+
(
Γ
(
x
y
))T (
ξ
χ
)
(1d)
subject to Φξ + Ψχ ≤ ρ (1e)
χ ∈ arg min
χ
{
φTχ : Ωφ ≤ γ −Πξ} . (1f)
The interaction among the Stackelberg leaders happens within their objective
function, as in (1a) and (1d). On the other hand, within each Stackelberg game,
each leader anticipates the reaction of their distinct followers. NASPs can be
promptly extended (i) to handle more than two leaders, (ii) to handle more than
one follower per leader, (iii) to have the followers of each leader interact in a Nash
game, and (iv) to enforce each follower to solve a convex quadratic program as
opposed to linear programs in (1c) and (1f). A dominant solution concept is
the one of Nash equilibrium — namely when each player cannot profitably and
unilaterally deviate from the prescribed strategy.
Primary Contributions
We are primarily motivated to model international energy markets with climate
change-aware regulatory authorities with profit-maximizing domestic energy pro-
ducers and we provide a game-theoretic framework to analyze this problem. In
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this game, energy producers – namely the Stackelberg followers – compete in
the domestic market, and are usually subject to restrictions in the form of tax
and/or caps from the regulatory authorities. The regulatory authorities – namely
the Stackelberg leaders – negotiate environmental-conscious agreements for en-
ergy trade within each other, thus engaging in a Nash game. The theoretical
abstraction NASP , models this problem as well as provides a general framework
to analyze games, in and outside the field of energy, when there are multiple
Stackelberg leaders, each with their personal set of followers, playing a Nash
game with each other. In this context, we make the following contributions in
this paper.
First, we characterize the computational complexity of deciding if a given
instance of NASP has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE ). We show that
even with restrictive assumptions such as single follower and bounded strategy
sets for all players, it is Σp2 -hard to decide if the instance has a PNE . Namely,
even with an oracle access to solve NP-hard problems instantaneously, one is
expected to make exponentialy many calls to such an oracle to decide the exis-
tence of PNE for a given instance of NASP . In other words, without strong con-
sequences in complexity theory, this translates to a bound of Ω(22
n
) elementary
operations required to solve the problem, where n is the size of representation
of the corresponding decision problem. This is quite surprising, since in most of
the cases in the literature, one can either prove that all games in a considered
category have a PNE , or prove sufficiently fast that a given instance has no
PNE . Second, we consider the computational complexity of deciding the exis-
tence of mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (MNE ) for NASPs. It can be trivially
shown that – with exactly one follower for each leader and boundedness in every
player’s problem – an MNE always exists (Corollary 1). However, even if one
of the leaders has an unbounded feasible set, it is again Σp2 -hard to decide an
existence of MNE .
Hence (third contribution), given these lower bounds to computationally find
PNE or MNE for NASPs, we provide a finite-time algorithm to do so. It re-
trieves an MNE for an instance of NASP when it exists, and provides a (double
exponentially-large) proof of infeasibility when an MNE does not exist. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm to identify MNE or PNE for
a game of this type. Fourth, we provide an enhancement to the algorithm to
exclusively seek for PNE s, or provide a proof of infeasibility. This is the case
of interest if mixed-strategies are not implementable in practice. Fifth, we pro-
vide another enhancement to the algorithms to find MNE s and PNE s, with an
iterative inner-approximation procedure that proves to be considerably faster
in practice. We also remark that the negative results (Σp2 -hard complexity) are
for the easier version of the problem (the latter defined trivial NASP) and our
positive algorithmic results are, on the contrary, for the harder version of the
problem with multiple followers. In addition, we also present several observa-
tions, for instance Remarks 1 and 3, which enlight our understanding of Nash
games where players solve nonconvex optimization problems.
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We believe that the above contributions both from the complexity and algo-
rithmic (computational) sides establish a solid benchmark against which future
progress can be measured.
Literature review.
Nash games gained popularity with the Nobel awarded papers of Nash (1951,
1950). Nash proved the existence of the so-called Nash equilibrium for games with
a finite number of players, and a finite number of strategies. By definition, these
equilibrium strategies ask that no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate
from the prescribed strategy. Generally, we distinguish between the pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium (PNE ), and the mixed strategy one (MNE ). The latter
generalizes the pure one, since each strategy in the support of the equilibrium
has an associated probability of being played. The concept of Nash equilib-
rium has naturally been extended to games where players have an uncountable
set of strategies. From an application perspective, Nash Games are extensively
adopted for modeling interactions within economic markets. For instance, gas
market bilevel formulations usually involve players solving convex optimization
problems parametrized in other players variables (Egging et al. 2010, Feijoo et al.
2016, Sankaranarayanan et al. 2018, Feijoo et al. 2018, Holz et al. 2008, Egging
et al. 2008, Stein and Sudermann-Merx 2018). On the other side, the cross-border
kidney exchange model (Carvalho et al. 2017), competitive lot-sizing models (Li
and Meissner 2011, Carvalho et al. 2018b), and the fixed charge transportation
model (Sagratella et al. 2019) feature players solving non-convex problems.
In contrast with Nash games, sequential ones partition the players in different
groups, and each group decides in a round – or level. If the rounds are two, then
the game is known as Stackelberg game (Stackelberg 1934, Candler and Norto
1977). Here, the agents playing in the first round are the leaders, while the ones
playing afterward are called followers. When each Stackelberg player solves an
optimization problem, then we have a bilevel program. In general, bilevel formu-
lations can model interactions where leaders have specific advantages over the
followers, for instance, a government taxing companies. Indeed, bilevel formula-
tions allure a nourished community of researchers. Bard et al. (1998, 2000) model
tax credits strategies in the context of biofuel production, and Brotcorne et al.
(2008), Labbe´ and Violin (2013) create bilevel pricing problems. Hobbs et al.
(2000), Gabriel and Leuthold (2010), Feijoo and Das (2014) model pricing and
environmental policies for energy markets, where power generators are leaders,
and network operators are followers.
When multiple leaders – each with possibly multiple followers – seek for an
equilibrium between each other, we fall into the category of EPEC s. Thereby
leaders often have a common set of followers, and the equilibrium of interest is
PNE . Sherali (1984) introduced EPEC s where both leaders and followers pro-
duce a homogeneous commodity, and followers adopt a reaction curve. Gabriel
et al. (2012) provide a Gauss-Seidel iteration technique to find PNE s for a re-
stricted class of EPEC s, where also followers from different leaders can interact.
Ralph and Smeers (2006), and Hu and Ralph (2007) extend the analysis on the
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existence of a PNE to specialized classes of EPEC s arising in electricity markets.
Leyffer and Munson (2010) introduce a weaker solution concept based on a non-
linear programming reformulation. DeMiguel and Xu (2009) craft the concept
of stochastic multi-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium for a special
form of investment-production interaction between the players. More recently,
Kulkarni and Shanbhag (2015, 2014) considered EPEC s with shared constraints,
presenting solution concepts and algorithms starting from the potentiality of
players’ objectives.
Complexity of Equilibria As previously mentioned, Nash (1951, 1950) proved
that a Nash equilibrium for finite games always exists, and thus the associ-
ated decision problem is trivial. However, since the proof is non-constructive, it
already unveils the difficulty of computing an equilibrium. Indeed, even for two-
players finite games in strategic-form, the problem of determining an equilibrium
is PPAD-complete (Chen and Deng 2006). Furthermore, even for games where
equilibria are guaranteed to exist, many variations of associated decision prob-
lems are known to be NP-complete (Gilboa and Zemel 1989). A few illustrative
examples are the existence of two equilibria, or the existence of an equilibrium
where a player’s payoff exceeds a given threshold. Besides, the existence of PNE
and MNE for games where players solve parametrized non-convex problems was
proven to be Σp2 -hard (Carvalho et al. 2018a, Carvalho 2019). Under this setting,
if players strategies are bounded, then an MNE always exists. For congestion
games, another widely studied class of Nash games, PNE s always exist due to
their potential nature (Rosenthal 1973). Del Pia et al. (2017) focus on conges-
tions games where the players strategies are described by totally unimodular
matrices. Within this context, the authors prove that if players have the same
feasible set of strategies, a PNE can be computed in polynomial time. In any
other case, the problem is PLS-complete. For what concerns the complexity of
Stackelberg games, the seminal result of Jeroslow (1985) enlightens the matter.
It proves that the computational complexity of sequential games rises one layer
up in the polynomial hierarchy for every additional round, even for linear prob-
lems. Thereupon, the classification of the computational complexity for NASPs
becomes almost natural.
Paper Organization The manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
definitions and restates some known results. Section 3 provides the complex-
ity results regarding NASPs. Section 4 presents an algorithm to find MNE for
NASP , proves its finiteness and correctness, and extends it with an inner ap-
proximation hierarchy. Section 5 enhances the proposed approaches and also
introduces a heuristic for computing PNE . Section 6 presents computational
tests, and, finally, Section 7 draws conclusions.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we provide definitions, notations, and recall some known results
in the context of polyhedral theory, Nash games and Stackelberg games.
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2.1 Definitions
Nash Games When players decide simultaneously, and with complete informa-
tion, we have a Nash Game. As a standard notation in game theory, let the
operator (·)−i denote (·) except i.
Definition 1 (Nash games). A Nash game P among n players is a finite
tuple of optimization problems P =
(
P 1, . . . , Pn
)
, where each P i is the problem
of the ithplayer. Simultaneously, each player i solves an optimization problem of
the form minxi∈Rni{f i(xi;x−i) : xi ∈ Fi}, where f i and Fi are their objective
function and the feasible set, respectively.
Moreover, we can further characterize a Nash game as (i) simple if, for every
player i and for some positive semidefinite matrixQi, and ci, Ci of appropriate di-
mensions, the objective is in the form of f i(xi;x−i) =
1
2
xi
T
Qixi+
(
ci + Cix−i
)
xi,
(ii) linear, if Qi = 0 for all i, namely each leader has a linear objective function,
(iii) facile, if the game is simple, and Fi is a polyhedron for all i ∈ [n].
Definition 2 (Simple parameterization). An optimization problem in y has
a simple parameterization with respect to x ∈ Rn` if the problem is in the form
of miny∈Rnf {f(y) + (Cx)T y : y ∈ F , Ax+By ≤ b}, where f : Rnf → R, and C,
A, B, b are matrices and vectors of appropriate dimensions, and F ⊆ Rnf .
A Nash game P = (P 1, . . . , Pn) has a simple parameterization with respect to
x ∈ Rn` if each optimization problem P 1(x), . . . , Pn(x) has a simple parameter-
ization with respect to x.
Definition 3 (Mixed and Pure-strategy Nash equilibria).
Let ν = (ν1, . . . , νn) where νi is a Borel probability distribution on Fi with
finite support, and F = F1 × · · · ×Fn. Then, ν is a MNE if for all i ∈ [n] and
x˜i ∈ Fi, then E(νi, ν−i) ≤ E(x˜i, ν−i). If all the distributions have a singleton
support, then the set of strategies is referred to as PNE.
PNE is a strong notion of equilibrium and even relatively trivial games — for
example, rock-paper-scissors — do not possess one. In contrast, an MNE always
exists for finite games (Nash 1950, 1951).
Stackelberg Games A Stackelberg-game is a multi-level game with 2 rounds of
decisions. First, the leader decides, optimizing their objective subject to some
constraints. Subsequently, the followers decide, with their objective and con-
straints now depending upon the leader’s decision (Candler and Townsley 1982).
Definition 4 (Stackelberg game). Let P (x) be a Nash game, SOL(P (x))
denotes its solution, and f : Rn`+nf → R. Then, a Stackelberg game is an opti-
mization problem of the form min
x∈Rn` ;y∈Rnf
{f(x, y) : (x, y) ∈ F , y ∈ SOL(P (x))}.
Within the previous definition, the Stackelberg is optimistic. Namely, if the
game has multiple optimal solutions SOL(P (x)), then y takes the value among
SOL(P (x)) benefitting the leader the most.
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Definition 5 (Simple Stackelberg game). A Stackelberg game is simple if
P (x) is a facile Nash game with a simple parameterization with respect to the
upper level variables x, F is a polyhedron, and f(x, y) is a linear function.
Definition 6 (NASP). A NASP is a linear Nash game N = (P 1, . . . , P k)
where for each i, P i is a simple Stackelberg game.
Definition 7 (Trivial NASP). A trivial NASP is a NASP where k = 2, and
P 1 and P 2 are simple bilevel games whose lower levels are linear programs with
a simple parameterization with respect to the upper level variables.
The additional assumptions holding on a trivial NASP (as of Definition 7) com-
pared to a general NASP (as of Definition 6) are seemingly strong. We require
that each leader has precisely one follower – as opposed to finitely many followers
– and that each follower solves a linear program – as opposed to a quadratic pro-
gram – with a simple parameterization with respect to the upper level variables.
The game between the Latin and Greek leaders presented in (1) is an example
of trivial NASP .
Tipically, within the optimization literature, Nash games are reformulated
as linear complementarity problem (LCP). LCPs have a rich theoretical basis
(Facchinei and Pang 2015b,a, Cottle et al. 2009), and can be solved as mixed-
integer programs (MIPs). Following the usual notation, the the operator x ⊥ y
is equivalent to xT y = 0.
Definition 8 (Linear complementarity problem). Given M ∈ Rn×n, q ∈
Rn, the linear complementarity problem ( LCP) asks to find a x ∈ Rn so that
0 ≤ x ⊥Mx+ q ≥ 0, or to show that no such x exists. We denote as feasible set
induced by the LCP, the set of all x satisfiying the condition of the LCP.
2.2 Known results.
Cottle et al. (2009) proved that a facile Nash game can be solved as an LCP .
Theorem 1 (Cottle et al. (2009)). Let P be a facile Nash game. Then, there
exist M, q such that every solution to the LCP defined by M, q is a PNE for P
and every PNE of P solves the LCP.
Basu et al. (2019), with Theorem 2, provide an extended formulation for the
feasible region of a simple Stackelberg game. This result is a critical ingredient
of our contribution, since it enables us to provide a polyhedral characterization
NASPs.
Theorem 2 (Basu et al. (2019)). Let S be the feasible set of a simple Stack-
elberg game. Then, S is a finite union of polyhedra. Conversely, let S be a finite
union of polyhedra. Then, there exists a simple Stackelberg game with P (x) con-
taining exactly 1 player such that the feasible region of the simple Stackelberg
game provides an extended formulation of S.
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Finally, the celebrated Theorem 3 from Balas (1985) allows us to retrieve the
closure of the convex hull for the union of a finite set of polyhedra.
Theorem 3 ((Balas 1985)). Given k polyhedra Si = {x ∈ Rn : Aix ≤ bi} for
i = 1, . . . k, then cl conv(
⋃k
i=1 Si) is given by the set {x ∈ Rn : ∃(x1, . . . , xk, δ) ∈
(Rn)k × Rk : x ∈ {Aixi ≤ δibi,
∑k
w=1 x
w = x,
∑k
w=1 δw = 1, δi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ [k]}}
3 Hardness of finding a Nash equilibrium
In what follows, we characterize the computational complexity of NASPs. We
formalize the intuition stemming from Jeroslow (1985) with a reduction from
the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL problem. The main results are summarized below.
Theorem 4. It is Σp2 -hard to decide if a trivial NASP has a PNE.
Corollary 1. If the feasible set of each player in a trivial NASP is a bounded
set, an MNE exists.
Theorem 5. It is Σp2 -hard to decide if a trivial NASP has an MNE.
In what follows, we will provide the proof of Theorems 4 and 5. In the first
instance, we formally introduce the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL.
Definition 9 (SUBSET SUM INTERVAL). Given q1, . . . , qk, p, t, k ∈ Z+, with none
of them equal to zero, and log2(t− p) ≤ k, does there exist a s ∈ Z : p ≤ s < t,
so that for all I ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , k} then ∑i∈I qi 6= s.
In other words, we seek – within an interval of integers – for a number s that
cannot be expressed as a sum of a subset of {q1, . . . , qk} or alternatively show
that no such s exists. Here, t − p can be chosen as a power of 2. For instance,
we may ask if there exist an r in ∈ Z+ such that 2r = t − p. Eggermont and
Woeginger (2013) proved that, given r in Z+ such that t− p = 2r, the problem
is Σp2 -hard.
Theorem 6 (Eggermont and Woeginger (2013)). Given that there exists
r ∈ Z+ such that t− p = 2r, SUBSET SUM INTERVAL is Σp2 hard.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4.). To show the hardness of NASP, we will rewrite
SUBSET SUM INTERVAL as a trivial NASP of comparable size. Then, appealing
to Theorem 6, we establish the hardness of a trivial NASP . Finally, we claim
that NASP is only a generalization of trivial NASP , and hence could not be any
easier.
Consider a trivial NASP as of in Definition 7. For the sake of clarity, we
call the two Stackelberg games associated with the trivial NASP the Latin, and
Greek game, respectively. The decision variables of the Latin game’s leader are
x, their follower controls y variables . Similarly, the decision variables of the
Greek game are ξ, and χ for their follower. As for the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL,
we stick to the notation introduced in Definition 9.
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Let b1, . . . , br ∈ {0, 1} as the unique r-bit binary representation of s − p:
for instance, {bi}ri=1 satisfies s − p =
∑r
i=1 bi2
i−1. Then, let P = k + 2r,
Q =
∑k
i=1 qi, and T = t − 1 + rQ, where both can be computed in polynomial
time with respect to the data in SUBSET SUM INTERVAL.
The Latin Game
max
x0,x1,...,x2P
∈R
y0,y1,...,y2P
∈R
: (T − 1)ξ0x0 +
k∑
i=1
qiξixP+i +Q
P∑
i=k+1
ξixP+i (2a)
subject to xi = 0 i = 1, . . . , k
(2b)
yi ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , 2P
(2c)
xi ≥ 0 i = 1, . . . , 2P
(2d)
P∑
i=k+1
xi ≤ r (2e)
xi + xP+i ≤ 1 i = 1, . . . , P
(2f)
x0 + xP+i ≤ 1 i = 1, . . . , P
(2g)
(y0, . . . , y2P ) ∈ arg min
y
{
2P∑
i=0
yi : yi ≥ −xi, ∀ i = 0, . . . , 2P
}
(2h)
The Greek Game
max
ξ0,ξ1,...,ξP
∈R
χ0,...,ξP
∈R
: (T − 1)ξ0 +
k∑
i=1
qiξi(1− xP+i) +Q
P∑
i=k+1
ξi(1− xi − xP+i)
+
k+r∑
i=k+1
2i−k−1ξi(1− xi − xP+i)
−
P∑
i=k+1
T (xiξi + (1− xi)(1− ξi − ξ0)) (2i)
subject to ξi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 0, . . . , P (2j)
ξi ≤ 1 ∀ i = 0, . . . , P (2k)
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χi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 0, . . . , P (2l)
P∑
i=k+1
ξi + rξ0 ≥ r (2m)
T ≥ Tξ0 +
k∑
i=1
qiξi +Q
P∑
i=k+1
ξi +
k+r∑
i=k+1
2i−k−1ξi (2n)
(χ0, . . . , χP ) ∈ arg min
χ
{
P∑
i=0
χi :
χi ≥ −ξi
χi ≥ ξi − 1 ∀ i = 0, . . . , 2P
}
(2o)
We claim the game in (2) has a PNE , if and only if the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL
instance has a decision YES.
Claim 1 The game defined in (2) is a trivial NASP.
Claim 2 The region in the space of x defined by (2c) and (2h) is the Carte-
sian product of ({xi : xi ≤ 0} ∪ {xi : xi ≥ 0}), for i = 0, . . . , 2P . Similarly, the
region in the space of ξ defined by (2l) and (2o) is the Cartesian product of
({ξi : ξi ≤ 0} ∪ {ξi : ξi ≥ 0}), for i = 0, . . . , P .
We refer the reader to the appendix for the proofs of Claims 1 and 2.
Claim 3 If
(
(x, y), (ξ, χ)
)
is a PNE for (2), then ξ0 6= 0.
Proof of Claim. First, observe that ξ 6= 0, since setting ξ0 = 1 is a feasible
profitable deviation for the Greek leader, regardless of the Latin leader’s decision.
Suppose ξ0 = 0 and for some ∅ 6= L ⊆ {1, . . . , P}, ξ` 6= 0. Note that the Latin
leader has no incentive to keep x0 = 1, which forces an objective value of 0.
Instead, it can choose x0 = 0, and xP+` = 1 for all ` ∈ L and any feasible value
for xP+` for ` ∈ {1, . . . , P} \ L. One can check that this is feasible and optimal
for the the Latin leader, given ξ0 = 0. This also means that the Greek leader’s
objective is 0, as each of the summands in their objective vanishes, and ξ0 = 0
makes the first term vanish. Hence, this cannot be a Nash equilibrium since the
Greek leader has a profitable deviation by setting ξ0 = 1 and ξi = 0 for all i 6= 0,
which is feasible and yields an objective value of T − 1 > 0. uunionsq
Claim 4 If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision YES, then (2) has a PNE.
Proof of Claim. Suppose there exists s ∈ Z+ such that p ≤ s ≤ t− 1, and for all
I ⊆ {1, . . . , k}, ∑i∈I qi 6= s. Also, recall the unique r-bit binary representation
of s− p, namely b1, . . . , br ∈ {0, 1}. Consider the following strategy:
x0 = 1 (3a)
xi = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , k (3b)
xi = bi−k ∀ i = k + 1, . . . , k + r (3c)
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xi = 1− bi−k−r ∀ i = k + r + 1, . . . , P = k + 2r (3d)
xi = 0 ∀ i = P + 1, . . . , 2P (3e)
yi = 0 ∀ i = 0, . . . , 2P (3f)
ξ0 = 1 (3g)
ξi = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , P (3h)
χi = 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , P (3i)
It is easy to check that the strategy in (3) is feasible. Given ξ, observe that the
strategy is optimal for the Latin leader as follows. Due to the choice ξi = 0 for
i 6= 0, all but the first term of the Latin leader vanish. The largest value the
first term can take corresponds to x0 = 1. The remaining terms do not affect
the Latin leader’s objective, as long as they are feasible.
For what concerns the Greek leader, the current objective is T − 1. We show
there exist no deviation which can improve their objective. With ξ0 = 1, clearly
no other deviation is feasible. Consider the deviation ξ0 = 0: with such strategy
the first term in the objective vanishes. LetM = {i ∈ {k+1, . . . , k+2r} : xi = 1}.
Observe that |M | = r, and let L = {k + 1, . . . , k + 2r} \M . Notice that we
require ξ` = 1 for ` ∈ L, otherwise the fifth term in the objective would be a
large negative quantity. Hence, the objective would not exceed the value of T−1.
With such a choice of ξ` for ` ∈ L, the fifth term in the objective evaluates to
0, and the fourth term evaluates to
∑
`∈L 2
`−k−i =
∑k+r
i=k+1(1 − bi−k)2i−k−1 =
2r−1+p−s = t−1−s. Therefore, the objective value is t−1+rQ−s. However,
since it is a YES instance of SUBSET SUM INTERVAL, the deficit s in the objective
value can never be made up by any choice of ξi for i = 1, . . . , k and by making
the second term equal to s. If such ξi are chosen to exceed s, then (2n) is violated
if it is strictly less than s, and the objective cannot exceed T − 1. Hence, this is
no longer a valid deviation. Thus (3) is indeed a Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
Claim 5 If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision NO, then (2) has no PNE.
Proof of Claim. We prove the result by contradiction. In orter to establish the
latter, assume that the SUBSET SUM INTERVAL instance has an answer NO, and
there exists a PNE
(
(x, y), (ξ, χ)
)
for (2), with ξ0 = 1. From Claims 2 and 3,
any PNE necessarily has ξ0 = 1. From (2n), ξ0 = 1 enforces that ξi = 0 for i =
1, . . . , T , and hence the Greek leader has an objective value of T − 1. Therefore,
with ξ =
(
1 0 . . . 0
)
, observe that the Latin leader’s objective is (T−1)x0. Thus,
we necessarily have x0 = 1. From (2g), we deduce xP+i = 0 for i = 1, . . . , P ,
while from (2e) we obtain xi ≤ rr+1 for i = 1, . . . , k. The only value of xi that
satisfies this condition along with (2h) is xi = 0 for i = 1, . . . , k That only leaves
xi for i = k + 1, . . . , k + 2r = P .
We can now show that – for any value of xi – the Greek leader has a profitable
deviation, namely it can get an objective strictly greater than T − 1. Let M =
{i ∈ {k + 1, . . . , k + 2r} : xi = 0}. From (2e), we have |M | ≥ r. We choose some
L ⊆M such that |L| = r, and for i ∈ L, we set ξi = 1. Since |L| = r, and L ⊆M ,
the third term in the Greek leader’s objective evaluates to rQ. The fourth term
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is in between 0 and 2r − 1, and the fifth term vanishes. Keeping in mind that
ξ0 = 0, the objective now evaluates to a number between
∑k
i=1 qiξi + rQ and∑k
i=1 qiξi + rQ + 2
r − 1. In other words, the objective is T − s + ∑ki=1 qiξi
and p ≤ s ≤ t − 1. Since this is a NO instance of SUBSET SUM INTERVAL,
∃I ⊆ {1, . . . , k} such that ∑i∈I qiξi = s. Set ξi = 1 if i ∈ I, and ξi = 0 if
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} \ I. This is feasible, and makes the objective value equal to T ,
which is a profitable deviation from T − 1. Therefore ((x, y), (ξ, χ)) is not a
Nash equilibrium. uunionsq
From Theorem 4, we have a direct implication of Corollary 2.
Corollary 2. Consider a linear Nash Game N = (P 1, . . . , Pn) where each P i
is an MIP . It is Σp2 -hard to decide if N has a PNE.
Proof (Proof of Corollary 2.). Bounded bilevel programs can be reformulated as
bounded integer programs of polynomial size (Basu et al. 2019). The Greek and
the Latin leaders’ problems defined in (2) are bounded bilevel programs, where
each variable necessarily takes value in [0, 1]. uunionsq
Furthermore – under an assumption of boundedness – we prove Corollary 1,
showing that an MNE always exists.
Proof (Proof of Corollary 1.). Let Fi be the feasible region of the i-th player
(leader), namely a bounded set. Given x−i, the objective of its optimization
problem is linear. Hence, there always exists an optimal solution, which is an
extreme point of conv(Fi). However, given that Fi are feasible sets of bilevel
linear programs, we know that the feasible region of the players is a finite union
of polyhedra from Theorem 2. It follows that conv(Fi) is a polyhedron. Since we
assume also boundedness, conv(Fi) is indeed a polytope. Thus, the i-th player’s
strategy is the set of extreme points of this polytope, which is finite in number.
Since the same reasoning holds for each player, this is a Nash game with finitely
many strategies. From Nash (1950, 1951), such a game has an MNE . uunionsq
From Corollary 1, deciding on the existence of an MNE is trivial if each player
has a bounded feasible set. We extend this result with Theorem 5, showing that
even if the feasible region of one player is unbounded, then deciding on the
existence of an MNE is Σp2 -hard.
Before proving Theorem 5, we introduce the technical Lemma 1. While The-
orem 2 shows that any finite union of polyhedra can be written as a feasible
region of a bilevel problem in a lifted space, Lemma 1 explicitly provides the
description of this set for a given union of two polyhedra.
Lemma 1. Consider the set S defined as the union of two polyhedra, namely
S = {(h, y, x) ∈ R3+ : h = x; y = 1} ∪ {(h, y, x) ∈ R3+ : h = 0; y = 0} (4)
S has an extended formulation as a feasible set of a simple bilevel program.
From Lemma 1 we can further derive Lemma 2.
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Lemma 2. Suppose S ⊆ Rn1 and T ⊆ Rn2 have an extended formulation as
bilevel programs. So does S × T .
Therefore, with Lemmata 1 and 2, we can then prove Theorem 5. Both the proofs
for these two lemmas can be found in the appendix.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). We reduce SUBSET SUM INTERVAL into a problem
of deciding the existence of an MNE for a trivial NASP . Let Q =
∑k
i=1 qi. Also,
as of Theorem 4, let the Latin game and the Greek game have Latin and Greek
terms, respectively.
Latin Game The Latin game is a Stackelberg game. The variables of the leader
and the follower are denoted by Latin alphabets x and y, respectively.
max
x0,...,xk+3r+1
∈R
y0,...,yk
∈R
:
x0
2
+
k∑
i=1
qixi + 2(Q+ 1)ξr+1xk+3r+1
− (Q+ 1)
(
r∑
i=1
2i−1xk+i + pxk+3r+1
)
(5a)
subject to xi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 0, . . . , k
(5b)
yi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 0, . . . , k (5c)
xi ≥ 1 ∀ i = 0, . . . , k
(5d)
xk+3r+1 = xk+2r+i ∀ i = 1, . . . , r (5e)
xk+3r+1 = p+
r∑
i=1
2i−1xk+r+i (5f)
x0
2
+
k∑
i=1
qixi ≤ xk+3r+1 (5g)
(xk+i, xk+r+i, xk+2r+i) ∈ S (as in (4)) ∀ i = 1, . . . , r
(5h)
(y0, . . . , yk) ∈ arg min
y
{
k∑
i=0
yi :
yi ≥ −xi
yi ≥ xi − 1∀ i = 0, . . . , k
}
(5i)
Greek Game Similarly, the Greek game is a Stackelberg game, where leader and
the follower variables are denoted by Greek alphabets ξ and χ, respectively.
max
ξ0,...,ξr+1
∈R
χ1,...,χr
∈R
: (1− x0)ξ0 (5j)
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subject to ξi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , r (5k)
χi ≥ 0 ∀ i = 1, . . . , r (5l)
ξi ≤ 1 ∀ i = 1, . . . , r (5m)
p+
r∑
i=1
2i−1ξi = ξr+1 (5n)
(χ1, . . . , χr) ∈ arg min
χ
{
r∑
i=1
χi :
χi ≥ −ξi
χi ≥ ξi − 1∀ i = 0, . . . , r
}
(5o)
uunionsq
Claim 6 The game defined in (5) is a trivial NASP.
Claim 7 The region of space for x – defined by (5c) and (5i) – is the Cartesian
product of ({xi : xi ≤ 0} ∪ {xi : xi ≥ 0}) for i = 0, . . . , k. Similarly the region
of the space for ξ – defined by (5l) and (5o) – is the Cartesian product of ({ξi :
ξi ≤ 0} ∪ {ξi : ξi ≥ 0}) for i = 1, . . . , k.
The proof of this claim is analogous to the ones of Claim 2, and Claim 1.
Claim 8 xk+3r+1 takes integer values only.
Proof of Claim. From (5h), each xk+r+i for i = 1, . . . , r can take a value of either
0 or 1, depending upon which of the two polyhedra (in the definition of S) the
variable falls in. Moreover, since in (5f) the RHS is a sum of integers, the LHS
xk+3r+1 is also an integer. uunionsq
Claim 9 (xk+3r+1)
2 =
∑r
i=1 2
i−1xk+i + pxk+3r+1 holds for the Latin game’s
feasible set.
Proof of Claim. Consider the set S defined in (4). For a point h = x and y = 1 in
the first polyhedra, one can write h = xy. Similarly, for a point h = 0 and y = 0
in the second polyhedron, then h = xy. Thus, the nonlinear equation h = xy is
valid for the set S. By multiplying both sides of (5f) with xk+3r+1, one gets
(xk+3r+1)
2 = pxk+2r+1 +
r∑
i=1
2i−1xk+r+ixk+3r+1
= pxk+3r+1 +
r∑
i=1
2i−1xk+r+ixk+2r+i
= pxk+3r+1 +
r∑
i=1
2i−1xk+i
The second equality follows from (5e), and the third equality from the fact that
h = xy is valid for S and (5h).
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Claim 10 Given some ξr+1 ∈ Z between p and t − 1, the Latin player has a
profitable unilateral deviation for any feasible strategy with xk+3r+1 6= ξr+1.
Proof of Claim. Note that if ξr+1 is between p and t− 1, then xk+3r+1 = ξr+1 is
feasible for the Latin game. Observe the last two terms of the objective function.
From Claim 9, we can rewrite them as (Q + 1)(2ξr+1xk+3r+1 − x2k+3r+1). By
focusing just on the last two terms, these reach a maximum value for the feasible
choice of xk+3r+1 = ξr+1. We can now argue that the player can never be optimal
by choosing xk+3r+1 6= ξr+1. As established in Claim 8, xk+3r+1 is restricted to
take integer values, and for any other choice xk+3r+1, the deficit in objective
value is at least Q + 1. However, even if each of the other terms take their
maximum possible value, the largest value they can add to is 0.5 +Q < Q+ 1.
the claim follows. uunionsq
Claim 11 If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision YES, then (2) has a PNE
(and hence an MNE).
Proof of Claim. Let s be an integer such that p ≤ s < t and ∀I ⊆ {1, . . . , k},∑
i∈I qi 6= s, and let b1, . . . , br ∈ {0, 1} be the unique r-bit binary representation
of s− p. Consider the following pure strategies for the players:
xk+3r+1 = s (6a)
xk+2r+i = s i = 1, . . . , r (6b)
xk+r+i = bi i = 1, . . . , r (6c)
xk+i = bis i = 1, . . . , r (6d)
x0 = 1 (6e)
ξ0 = 0 (6f)
ξi = bi i = 1, . . . , r (6g)
ξr+1 = s (6h)
Finally, choose xi ∈ {0, 1} for i = 1, . . . , k such that
∑k
i=1 qixi is the largest
value not exceeding s. Since it is a YES instance of SUBSET SUM INTERVAL,∑k
i=1 qixi ≤ s− 1, and thus the strategy is indeed feasible for both the players.
The Latin player has no feasible profitable deviation. This follows from the
fact that xk+3r+1 cannot be chosen differently due to Claim 10. Moreover, the
first two terms in the above strategy already take the largest possible value not
violating (5g). Thus the Latin player has no profitable deviation. Now for the
Greek player, since x0 = 1, the objective value is always zero, and cannot be
improved. Thus, the strategy in (6) is indeed a PNE . uunionsq
Claim 12 If SUBSET SUM INTERVAL has decision NO, then (2) has no MNE.
Proof of Claim. Recall xk+3r+1 is forced to be an integer between p and t−1. For
any choice of xk+3r+1, x0 = 0 is selected and x1, . . . , xk are so that (5g) holds
with equality. There is no incentive to choose x0 = 1, which will contribute to
only 0.5 in the objective. However, with x0 = 0, the Greek player can choose
arbitrarily large values of ξ0. Hence, there is always a larger choice of ξ0 which
constitute a profitable deviation. Thus, no equilibrium exists for the game. uunionsq
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Algorithm 1 Enumeration algorithm to obtain an MNE for a NASP
Input: A description of NASP N = (P 1, . . . , Pn).
Output: For each i = 1, . . . , n, x̂ij is a pure-strategy played with probability p
i
j , pre-
senting a mixed-strategy with support size ki.
1: for i = 1, ..., n do
2: Enumerate the polyhedra whose union defines the feasible set Fi of P
i.
3: F˜i ← cl convFi by applying Theorem 3.
4: P˜ i ← objective function of P i and a feasible set of F˜i.
5: end for
6: Solve the facile Nash game N˜ = (P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) to obtain either a PNE , (x˜1, . . . , x˜n)
or show that no PNE exists.
7: if no PNE exists for N˜ then
8: There is no MNE for N ; exit returning failure.
9: end if
10: for i = 1, ..., n do
11: if x˜i ∈ Fi then
12: x̂i1 ← x˜i; pi1 ← 1; ki ← 1.
13: else
14: x˜i =
∑ki
j=1 ηj x̂
i
j for x̂
i
1, . . . , x̂
i
ki ∈ Fi with ηj ≥ 0 and
∑ki
j=1 ηj = 1.
15: pij ← ηj for j = 1, . . . , ki.
16: end if
17: end for
18: return (x̂ij , p
i
j) for each i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, ..., k
i.
4 An enumeration algorithm to find MNEs for NASPs
First, we introduce Algorithm 1, which enumerates the polyhedra whose union
corresponds to the feasible region of each player. Then, it finds a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium in the convex hull of the feasible regions of each player. We
prove the equivalence between finding a PNE over the convex hull, and the
original problem.
The feasible region Consider the feasible region of a simple Stackelberg game,
given by {A′u + B′v ≤ b, v ∈ SOL(P (u))}. Using the KKT conditions of the
players in P (u), we can rewrite the latter by an extended formulation, as
S =
x : Ax ≤ bz = Mx+ q
0 ≤ xi ⊥ zi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ C
 . (7)
Note that the set S is a union of polyhedra.
Preliminary Enumeration Algorithm We present Algorithm 1, which exploits
the knowledge that the feasible region of each player is a finite union of polyhedra
(Basu et al. 2019). Step 2 explicitly enumerates all such polyhedra, while Step 3
computes the closure of their convex hull using Theorem 3. Since this convex
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(a) The players’ feasible regions. From
Theorem 2, this is a finite union of
polyhedra. Step 2 of Algorithm 1
(b) With Theorem 3, we compute the
convex-hull of each player’s feasible region.
Step 3 of Algorithm 1
(c) Given the convex-hulls, the problem
reduces to a MIP as of Theorem 1. Step 6
of Algorithm 1
!
!
(d) The solution ? can be interpreted as a
convex combination of feasible strategies.
Steps 12 and 14 of Algorithm 1
Fig. 2: A pictorial reprsentation of Algorithm 1.
hull is also a polyhedron, the game N˜ (defined in Step 6) is a facile Nash game,
and we can get a PNE for the game using Theorem 1.
Let x˜ be a PNE of N˜ and x˜i be the strategy of the i-th player. If x˜i belongs
to Fi, then at equilibrium i plays x˜i in N . If x˜i does not belong to Fi, it is still
contained in cl convFi. Thereby, x˜i can be expressed as a convex combination
of points – or strategies – in Fi or a limit of such points. Player i would then
play a mixed-strategy where each weight in the convex combination – or δ of
Theorem 3 – is the probability of playing the corresponding pure-strategy, as in
Step 14 of Algorithm 1. A visualization of the rationale behind the algorithm is
in Figure 2. We formalize the correctness, and finite termination of the above
procedure in Theorem 7.
Theorem 7. Algorithm 1 terminates finitely and (i) if it returns x̂ij , p
i
j for each
i = 1, . . . , n, and j = 1, . . . , ki, then the strategy profile is indeed an MNE for
the NASP, (ii) if it returns failure, then N has no MNE.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7.). For the purpose of this proof, we adopt the same
symbols introduced in Algorithm 1. First, the algorithm terminates in a finite
number of steps: all loops in Algorithm 1 are finite loops, Step 2 ends finitely
since there are only finitely many polyhedra (see Theorem 2), and Step 3 is also
a finite procedure.
Proof of Statement (i) Observe that if Algorithm 1 does not return failure, then
Step 6 finds PNE x˜ for N˜ . The objective function of each player is linear, and
the distribution for the MNE has a finite support. Therefore, one can observe
that - for each player i - the following holds:
E
((
ci + Cix̂−i
)T
x̂i
)
=
∑
j′
ki∑
j=1
p−ij′ p
i
j
(
ci + Cix̂−ij′
)T
x̂ij =
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(
ci + Cix˜−i
)T
x˜i. (8)
Assume a generic player i has an unilateral profitable deviation †x̂ij , and †pij
for i = 1, . . . , `i from x̂i in their P˜ i problem. Such a deviation is also a mixed-
strategy profile. Consider now the pure-strategy for N˜ given by
∑`i
j=1(†pij † x̂ij).
The is feasible for the facile game P˜ i. Therefore, leveraging on the linearity
of each player’s objective function, we can show that this is also a profitable
deviation for P˜ i in N˜ , and hence find a contradiction.
(
ci + Cix˜−i
)T
x˜i =
∑
j′
ki∑
j=1
p−ij′ p
i
j
(
ci + Cix̂−ij′
)T (
x̂ij
)
(9)
≥
∑
j′
`i∑
j=1
p−ij′ † pij
(
ci + Cix˜−ij′
)T (†x̂ij) (10)
=
ci + Ci
∑
j′
p−ij′ x˜
−i
j′
T  `i∑
j=1
†pij † x̂ij
 (11)
=
(
ci + Cix˜−i
)T  `i∑
j=1
†pij † x̂ij
 (12)
Here (12) follows by plugging the profitable deviation into (8), and exploiting
its linearity. Since we have a profitable deviation for the mixed stragey for N ,
there exists an unilateral deviation for N from x˜. This contradicts the fact that
x˜ is a PNE for N . Therefore, such a deviation cannot exist.
Proof of Statement (ii) To prove this statement, we prove its contrapositive.
Namely, we show that if N has an MNE , then Step 6 obtains a PNE for N˜ and
will not return failure. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that N˜ has a PNE .
Let the MNE of N be given by each player i ∈ [n] playing xi1, . . . , xiki with
probability pi1, . . . , p
i
ki
, respectively. Let x˜i =
∑ki
j=1 p
i
jx
i
j be the a feasible pure-
strategy for player i. It follows that (x˜1, . . . , x˜n) is a feasible pure-strategy for
N˜ , and we now show it is indeed a PNE for N˜ . Given the above MNE for N ,
we know that
∑
j′
ki∑
j=1
p−ij′ p
i
j(C
ix−ij′ + c
i)Txij ≤
∑
j′
p−ij′ (C
ix−ij′ + c
i)Txi,∀ xi ∈ Fi.
Due to the linearity of the objective function, it follows that:(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
x˜i ≤ (Cix˜−i + ci)T xi ∀xi ∈ Fi. (13)
If (13) holds for all xi ∈ cl conv(Fi), for all i, then x˜ is a PNE of N˜ and the
proof will be complete. First, we show that (13) holds for xi ∈ conv(Fi). Let
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xi =
∑`
j=1 λjx
i
j , where x
i
j ∈ Fi and λj ≥ 0 and
∑`
j=1 λj = 1. Now consider the
` inequalities of (13), each one for xij for j = 1, . . . , l. Multiply these inequalities
by non-negative λj on both sides, and add to obtain
(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
x˜i ≤
∑`
j=1
λj
(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
xij
=
(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
xi
In the second instance, to show the same holds for xi ∈ cl conv(Fi), consider a
convergent sequence xi1, x
i
2, . . . with each x
i
j ∈ conv(Fi) and limj→∞ xij = xi.(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
x˜i ≤ (Cix˜−i + ci)T xij ∀ j = 1, 2, . . .
=⇒ lim
j→∞
(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
x˜i ≤ lim
j→∞
(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
xij
=⇒ (Cix˜−i + ci)T x˜i ≤ (Cix˜−i + ci)T ( lim
j→∞
xij
)
=
(
Cix˜−i + ci
)T
xi
Thus, (13) holds for all xi ∈ cl conv(Fi), and x˜ is indeed a PNE of N˜ . uunionsq
Remark 1. Within the proof of Theorem 7, we never exploit any specific prop-
erties of simple Stackelberg games. In fact, the only assumptions we leverage on
is that the problem is a linear Nash game (i.e., objective of each player is of
the form (ci + Cix−i)Tx). In this case, it is sufficient to solve the problem for
PNE in the convex hull of each player’s feasible set to compute an MNE for
the original problem. In this spirit, if one can compute the convex hull of the
player’s feasible region, and if objectives are linear, then every game is a convex
game.
5 Enhancing the algorithm
In this section, we present two enhancements of Algorithm 1. In Section 5.1 we
introduce an iterative procedure to approximate the closure of the convex hull of
each player feasible set. Thereby, we avoid the possibly costly and unnecessary
enumeration of all the polyhedra defining the feasible sets. In Section 5.2, we
tailor the algorithms to specially retrieve PNE s as opposed to general MNE s.
5.1 Inner approximation algorithm
While Algorithm 1 is guaranteed to terminate and solve the problem, we in-
troduce a procedure that can improve computational tractability. The feasible
region of a simple Stackelberg game is a finite union of polyhedra (see Theo-
rem 2), and their convex hull can be computed using Theorem 3. However, since
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there may be exponentially many polyhedra, the description of the convex hull
could become untractably large. Algorithm 1 intensively leverage on the com-
plete enumeration of such polyhedra in Step 2. The central intuition is to limit
the enumeration by iteratively refining the description of the convex hull for
each player. This procedure is also valid for an individual Stackelberg game or
a bilevel program. However, its importance is more relevant when dealing with
NASPs, where the computation of this convex-hull is essential. The key compo-
nents of this approach are the polyhedral relaxation of the set S defined in (7),
and the concept of selected polyhedron.
Definition 10 (Polyhedral relaxation). The polyhedral relaxation of the set
S defined in (7) is given by the set O0 = {x : Ax ≤ b, z = Mx+ q, xi ≥ 0, zi ≥
0 ∀ i ∈ C}
Clearly, this set contains cl conv(S), and is hence a relaxation. Also, while S is
generally not a polyhedron, its polyhedral relaxation is.
Definition 11 (Selected polyhedron). Let b ∈ {0, 1}|C| be a binary encoding,
and let C = {c1, . . . , ck}. Then, the selected polyhedron corresponding to b is
P(b) = {xci ≤ 0, ∀ i ∈ {i : bi = 0}}
⋂{[Mx+ q]ci ≤ 0, ∀ i ∈ {i : bi = 1}}.
We can then formally define the concept of inner approximation.
Definition 12 (Inner Approximation). Let J = {j1, . . . , j`} ⊆ {0, 1}mf .
Then the inner approximation defined by J is IJ = cl conv
(⋃
b∈J P(b) ∩ O0
)
.
Remark 2. The size of the extended formulation of IJ is bounded by O(|J |).
To ensure a perfect description, we need a choice of J = {0, 1}|C|. However,
|J | = 2|C| and a description of cl conv(S) will be exponentially large. Unless
P = NP, there cannot be any asymptotical improvements (Bard 1991).
Algorithm 2 presents the inner approximation algorithm – an enhancement
to Algorithm 1– to retrieve an MNE for NASPs. It iteratively constructs an
increasingly accurate inner approximation for the players’ feasible regions in the
NASP , and seeks for a PNE for this restricted game N˜ (Step 4).
Let F1, . . . ,Fn, be the inner approximations of the feasible sets of player
1, . . . , n. One can compute the closure of the convex hull for each of these ap-
proximation, and solve the associated facile Nash game N˜ . If x is a Nash equilib-
rium of N˜ , the algorithm checks if x – or the associated mixed-strategy implied
by x (similarly to Step 14 of Algorithm 1) – is a Nash equilibrium for the orig-
inal game N . If this is the case, then the algoithm terminates and returns the
equilibrium. Conversely, if this mixed-strategy is not an MNE of N , there exists
a profitable deviation x̂i for some player such that x̂i 6∈ Fi. Thereby, we re-
fine the inner approximation of i-th player’s feasible set by adding a polyhedron
containing x̂i. At each iteration of the algorithm, we keep on adding polyhe-
dra containing the profitable deviations. However, N˜ may not have a PNE in a
given iteration (Step 4). In this case, we gain no additional knowledge in terms
of which polyhedra to add to the inner approximation. Therefore, we arbitrarily
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Algorithm 2 Inner approximation to obtain an MNE for a NASP
Input: A description of NASP N = (P 1, . . . , Pn) and J = (J1, ..., Jn) where J i ⊆
{0, 1}|Ci| where Ci is the set of indices of complementarity (⊥) conditions for the
i-th player.
Output: For each i = 1, . . . , n, x̂ij is a pure-strategy played with probability p
i
j , pre-
senting a mixed-strategy with support size ki.
1: function IterInnerApproxNash(N, J)
2: F̂i ←inner approximation defined by J i and F˜i ← cl conv F̂i .
3: P˜ i ← objective function of P i and a feasible set F˜i.
4: Solve the facile Nash game N˜ = (P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) to obtain solution x. . Might fail
5: x̂1, ..., x̂n ← getDeviation(P, x)
6: if x̂i = NULL for all i = 1, ..., n then
7: return x.
8: end if
9: for i = 1, ...n do
10: if x̂i 6= NULL then
11: b˜i ←binary encoding of a polyhedron containing x̂i. J i ← J i ∪ b˜i.
12: end if
13: end for
14: return InnerApproxNash(N, J).
15: end function
add one or more polyhedra to the feasible region of each player in the problem,
keeping the algorithm running. We define as the extension strategy the criteria
by which such polyhedra are selected.
Broadly speaking, in optimization problems, a point contained in an inner
approximation of the feasible set, is feasible for the original problem and provides
a primal bound for the original problem. However, this is not true in the case of
a Nash game. In Remark 3 below, we show that the inner approximation game
might have a Nash equilibrium while the original game does not. Conversely, we
also show that the original game might have a Nash equilibrium while an inner
approximation does not.
Remark 3 (Inner approximation N˜ might have an MNE but N might not). There
might be cases in which the inner approximation has no MNE , but the original
NASP does. Consider the following players’ problems and their inner approxi-
mation.
Latin Player: min
x
{ξx : x ∈ R, x ≥ 0} (14a)
Greek Player: min
ξ,χ
{xξ : ξ ∈ [−5, 5];χ ≥ 0;
χ ∈ arg min
χ
{χ : χ ≥ ξ − 1;χ ≥ −ξ − 1}} (14b)
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Using KKT conditions on the follower’s problem, the Greek ’s problem can be
rewritten as
min
ξ,χ,µ
{
xξ : ξ ∈ [−5, 5];µ1 + µ2 = 1;χ ≥ 0; 0 ≤ µ1 ⊥ χ− ξ + 1 ≥ 00 ≤ µ2 ⊥ χ+ ξ + 1 ≥ 0
}
The polyhedra P (b) corresponding to b = (0, 0), and b = (1, 1) are empty. The
remaining two polyhedra can be projected to the ξ space as [−5,−1] ∪ [1, 5].
We claim that the problem in (14) has no Nash equilibrium. This is because,
irrespective of the Latin player’s decision, an optimal decision for the Greek
player is ξ = −5. For such a value of ξ, the Latin player has an unbounded
objective. Consider the inner approximation due to the choice J = {(0, 1)}. The
equivalent feasible regions can be expressed as follow.
Latin Player: min {ξx : x ∈ R, x ≥ 0} (15a)
Greek Player: min {xξ : ξ ∈ R, ξ ∈ [1, 5]} (15b)
In (15), the inner approximation is exact for the Latin player and is a strict inner
approximation for the Greek player. However, (15) has a PNE (ξ, x) = (0, 1).
Conversely, it can also happen that the original NASP has no MNE , but
the inner approximation does. For such an example, replace the objective of
the Greek player in (14) with a minimization of −xξ, and the corresponding
inner approximation of the Greek player in (15) with ξ ∈ [−5,−1]. This inner
approximation game has no Nash equilibrium. However, the original game has
a Nash equilibrium of (ξ, x) = (0, 5).
5.2 Enhancements for PNEs
In certain applications, deterministic strategies are preferred over a randomized
ones. Thus, one necessarily requires a PNE or show that no PNE exists. With
this motivation, we alter Algorithm 1 to specifically retrieve PNE s, or prove no
PNE exists.
Enumeration for PNE This algorithm is similar to Algorithm 1, hence we assume
the same notation. First, the procedure explicitly enumerates all the polyhedra in
the feasible region of each player, and computes their convex hull. In addition, it
introduces in N˜ a set of binary variables forcing the equilibrium strategy, for each
player, to be strictly in the original feasible region rather than solely in the convex
hull. From Theorem 2, the feasible region for each NASP ’s player is a finite union
of polyhedra. Let the feasible region of the i-th leader be Fi =
⋃gi
j=1 P
i
j , where
P ij = {Aijx ≤ bij} is a polyhedron. Moreover, Theorem 3 gives cl conv(Fi) as
Aijx
i
j ≤ bijδij for j ∈ [gi], xi =
∑gi
j=1 x
i
j , and
∑gi
j=1 δ
i
j = 1. If for some j, δ
i
j = 1,
then the projection x is strictly in the polyhedron P ij . Since we can reformulate
a NASP as a MIP feasibility problem, we enforce a new set of constraints in N˜
requiring each δij to be binary in N˜ . Hence, each PNE for N˜ is also a PNE for
N , and if N˜ has no PNE , also N has no PNE . In addition, for the equivalence
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between PNE s in N˜ and N , the condition of N being a NASP can be relaxed.
In concrete, it is sufficient that leaders’ objectives in N are convex – observe
that under this case, the reasoning in the proof of statement (ii) for Theorem 7
directly follows.
We refer the reader to the appendix for the pseudocode of this procedure.
6 Computational Tests
We test our algorithms1 on two different datasets, InstanceSetA and Instance-
SetB2, where the instances are based on an energy trade game between govern-
ments. Governments act as Stackelberg leaders, trading energy in a Nash Game
among themselves. Their objective is to minimize their emissions and maximize
tax incomes. Within each country, energy producers act as Stackelberg followers,
who also play a Nash game among themselves, maximizing their profits. In In-
stanceSetA the number of countries ranges between 3 to 5, while in InstanceSetB
the number is fixed to 7. In general, InstanceSetB is designed to be harder than
InstanceSetA. These sets of instances, by themselves, could also serve as bench-
mark instances for future algorithms solving NASPs. We refer to the appendix
for more detailed insights on the instances and computational details.
An instance is said to be solved if an MNE is found, or a certificate of
inexistence is returned, namely no MNE exists. We set a time limit TL = 1800
seconds, and test on a 8-cores Intel(R) Xeon Gold 6142, with 32GB of RAM,
and Gurobi 9.0. In our implementation, we introduce 3 extention strategies for
Algorithm 2: given a lexicographic order for each leader’s polyhedra, k of them
are added sequentially, reverse-sequentially, or randomly.
Table 1: Results summary for different algorithmic configurations, and equilibria
for InstanceSetA.
Time (s) Wins
Algorithm ES k EQ NO All EQ NO Solved
FE - - 29.08 0.12 120.21 6 82 140/149
Seq 1 6.65 0.35 51.33 3 0 145/149
Seq 3 17.76 0.18 55.82 5 0 145/149
Seq 5 6.40 0.15 51.08 3 0 145/149
Rev.Seq 1 7.97 0.36 3.73 26 0 149/149
Rev.Seq 3 11.29 0.18 53.12 4 0 145/149
Rev.Seq 5 9.53 0.15 76.41 5 0 143/149
Random 1 5.22 0.36 26.60 8 0 147/149
Random 3 32.42 0.18 85.65 5 0 143/149
MNE
InnerApp
Random 5 23.67 0.15 58.26 2 0 145/149
PNE FE-P - - 7.25 0.12 328.23 – – 122/149
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Table 2: Results summary for different algorithmic configurations, and equilibria
for InstanceSetB.
Time (s) Wins
Algorithm ES k EQ NO All EQ NO Solved
FE - - 260.29 1.12 1174.32 0 2 20/50
Seq 1 39.26 9.64 672.24 1 0 32/50
Seq 3 62.66 3.88 616.25 1 0 34/50
Seq 5 24.03 2.83 733.97 1 0 30/50
Rev.Seq 1 171.47 9.66 262.74 27 0 47/50
Rev.Seq 3 13.85 3.86 585.27 4 0 34/50
Rev.Seq 5 78.57 2.83 798.90 6 0 29/50
Random 1 34.65 9.65 497.06 0 0 37/50
Random 3 123.02 3.87 588.03 2 0 36/50
MNE
InnerApp
Random 5 39.18 2.86 711.77 4 0 41/50
PNE FE-P - - 7.36 1.12 1441.95 – – 10/50
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the computational results for InstanceSetA and
InstanceSetB, respectively. The upper parts of the tables reports results for the
full enumeration Algorithm 1 (FE ) and Algorithm 2 (InnerApp), where an MNE
solves the instances. In the bottom part, we specifically seek for PNE s with the
enhanced algoritm presented in the Section 5.2 (FE-P). In the third column, if
the algorithm is the inner approximation, we highlight the extension strategies,
and the relative parameter k in the following column. Fifth, sixth, and sev-
enth columns are, respectively, average time when: (i) an MNE is found (EQ),
(ii) certificate of non existence is returned (NO) and (iii) for all instances. In
the eighth and ninth column we report the number ot times the row’s algorithm
outperforms all the others, namely wins in terms of computing times. Finally,
the tenth columns reports how many instances do not trigger the time limit.
For MNE s, InnerApp achieves better performances than FE, being on av-
erage 2x faster on all instances, and up to 30x when an MNE exists (see In-
nerApp-RevSeq-1 in Table 1). Table 2 shows the full potential of InnerApp,
which remakably reduces computational times compared to FE. Especially, In-
nerApp can solve almost all the 50 hard instances compared to the 20 solved by
FE. Besides, when no equilibrium exists, InnerApp will always terminate at its
last iteration, namely the one corresponding to FE. With no surprise then FE
returns a non-existence certificate always faster than InnerApp. Both the algo-
rithms InnerApp and FE – when asked to retrieve a generic MNE – may return
a PNE . This happens 37.6%, and 30.4% within InstanceSetA and InstanceSetB,
respectively. Hence, there is a natural need for FE-P.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Our theoretical and computational framework tackles NASPs, where players of
a Nash game solve linear bilevel programs, and each leader can have several
followers playing a simple Nash game among themselves. We have shown that
deciding existence of PNE and MNE for NASPs is Σp2 -hard, and we provided
a family of algorithms to find MNE s as well as PNE s for the problem. We have
proven it is sufficient to compute an MNE over the convex hull of each player’s
feasible region to retrieve a MNE for the original problem.
This work expands our knowledge on algorithmic approaches to compute
equilibria, in particular MNE s. In addition to a theoretical characterization of
these algorithmic methods, it analyzes the their practical efficiency, settles their
limitations, and opens up for new future directions by establishing a solid bench-
mark against which future progress can be measured.
In terms of forthcoming work, the computation of multiple equilibria, or
their selection accordingly to some specified criteria are interesting directions.
Furthermore, it may be worth developing procedures to prune parts of the fea-
sible regions (e.g, polyhedra) not in the support of any equilibrium. This last
direction would remarkably speed up equilibria computation. Any advancements
on these proposed lines of research would enable us to tackle more general cases,
for instance, where interactions among followers of different leaders are allowed.
Endnotes
1. Full implementation with detailed documentation are available on https:
//github.com/ssriram1992/EPECsolve.
2. All instances are available on https://github.com/ds4dm/EPECInstances.
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Appendix
In this appendix, we complement the proofs of Section 3, the pseudo-code for the
PNE s algorithm, and we provide an overview of the computational instances.
Extensions to proofs of hardness
Proof. Proof of Claim 1. All the constraints are linear, and if the variables of
the other player are fixed, the objectives are also linear. Also, the follower is
simply parameterized in their leader’s variables. There are precisely two leaders,
and their interaction follows the definition of a simple Nash game. Hence – by
definition – the game in (2) is a trivial NASP .
Proof. Proof of Claim 2. Notice that the constraints in (2h) enforce yi ≥ max(−xi, xi−
1), and since yi is minimized, it has necessarily to be equal to max(xi− 1,−xi).
However, if this quantity should be non-negative – as enforced in (2c) – then
either xi ≤ 0 or 1− xi ≤ 0 should hold. The claim follows.
Proof. Proof of Lemma 1. The following bilevel problem gives the necessary
extended formulation. Variables z1, z2, . . . are the variables in the lifted space,
which can be projected out.
x ≥ 0 (16a)
y ≥ 0 (16b)
h ≥ 0 (16c)
y ≤ 1 (16d)
h ≤ x (16e)
z1, . . . , z6 ≥ 0 (16f)
(z1, , . . . , z6) ∈ arg min
z

6∑
i=1
zi :
z1 ≥ h− x ; z1 ≥ −h
z2 ≥ 1− y ; z2 ≥ −h
z3 ≥ y − 1 ; z3 ≥ −h
z4 ≥ x− h ; z4 ≥ −y
z5 ≥ h− x ; z5 ≥ −y
z6 ≥ y − 1 ; z6 ≥ −y

(16g)
Proof. Proof of Lemma 2. If S has an extended formulation given by {(x, y) :
ASx+BSy ≤ bS ; y ∈ arg min{fTS y : CSx+DSy ≤ gS}}, and if T has an extended
formulation given by {(x, y) : ATx+BT y ≤ bT ; y ∈ arg min{fTT y : CTx+DT y ≤
gT }}, then the following is an extended formulation of S × T :
{(x, y, u, v) : ASx+BSy ≤ bS ;ATu+BT v ≤ bT ;
(y, v) ∈ arg min{fTS y + fTT v : CSx+DSy ≤ gSCTu+DT y ≤ gT }}
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Proof. Proof of Claim 6. All constraints are linear, and if the variables of the
other player are fixed, the objectives are also linear. The constraints (5h) are valid
due to Lemma 1. Also, for Lemma 2, we can have multiple bilevel constraints in
(5h) and (5i). Each follower is simply parameterized in their leader’s variables.
There are precisely two leaders, and their interaction follows the definition of a
simple Nash game.
NASP with no PNE but only an MNE
Example 1. Considering the following Latin-Greek trivial NASP .
Latin Player
max
x,y
: x1ξ1 + x2ξ2 (17a)
x, y ≥ 0 (17b)
x ≤ 1 (17c)
x1 + x2 = 1 (17d)
y ∈ arg min
y
{
y1 + y2 :
yi ≥ −xi
yi ≥ xi − 1 for i = 1, 2
}
(17e)
Greek Player
max
ξ,χ
: x2ξ1 + x1ξ2 (17f)
ξ, χ ≥ 0 (17g)
ξ ≤ 1 (17h)
ξ1 + ξ2 = 1 (17i)
χ ∈ arg min
χ
{
χ1 + χ2 :
χi ≥ −ξi
χi ≥ ξi − 1 for i = 1, 2
}
(17j)
The only feasible decisions for both the Latin and the Greek player in (17)
are {(1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0)}. So the game can be written as a normal form game.
The pay-offs for these finitely many strategies can be computed to be that if the
Latin and the Greek player choose the same strategy, then the Latin player gets
a pay off of 1 and the Greek player gets a pay off of 0. If they choose different
strategies, then the Latin player gets a pay off of 0 and the Greek player gets
a pay off of 1. One can easily check that the unique Nash equilibrium for this
game is an MNE and that no PNE exists.
Enumeration algorithm to obtain a PNE
Algorithm 3 reports the pseudo-code for the algorithm described in Section 5.2.
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Algorithm 3 Enumeration algorithm to obtain a PNE for a NASP
Input: A description of NASP N = (P 1, . . . , Pn).
Output: For each i = 1, . . . , n, a pure-strategy x̂i, such that the strategy profile is a
PNE or a proof that no PNE exists.
1: for i = 1, ..., n do
2: Enumerate the polyhedra whose union defines the feasible set Fi of P
i.
3: F˜i ← cl convFi by applying Theorem 3.
4: P˜ i ← objective function of P i and a feasible set of F˜i.
5: end for
6: N˜ = (P˜ 1, ..., P˜n) the facile Nash game.
7: Enforce δij for i = 1, . . . , n, j = 1, . . . , g
i in N˜ to be binary.
8: if N˜ is infeasible then
9: return No PNE exists.
10: else
11: return Project the solution of N˜ to the space of the original variables of N .
12: end if
Computations
Goverments act as Stackelberg leaders by trading energy, with the aim of min-
imizing their emissions, and eventually to maximize tax incomes. Within each
country, energy producers act as Stackelberg followers and play a Nash game be-
tween themselves, aiming to maximize their profits. Each country is interested
to impose a tax that is not preventing profitable domestic production, as it is
constrained to keep the domestic energy price less than a predetermined thresh-
old. We present the optimization problems of the players formally below. For
ease of understanding the quantities in red are parameters, i.e., inputs to the
model. And the quantities in blue are decision variables, decided by the country.
Quantities in green are variables of a different player influencing the country’s
problem. Each country C solves the following problem.
min
qp,tp,qimp,q
C
exp
:
∑
p∈P
Cpemmisionq
p − btpqp
+ ∑
C′∈C\C
piC
′
qC
′→C
imp − piCqCexp
(18a)
subject to tp ≤ tp (18b)
αC − βC
∑
p∈P
qp + qCimp − qCexp
 ≥ piC (18c)
∑
C′∈C
qC
′→C
imp = q
C
imp (18d)
qp ∈ SOL(Lower Level Nash Game) (18e)
Cpemmision is the emission penalty that p encounters while producing a unit quan-
tity of energy. This number is the product of cost incurred due to the emission
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of one unit of greenhouse gases (GHG), and the quantity of GHG emitted for
each unit of energy produced by the producer p. b dictates whether the objec-
tive should include the tax revenue earned by the government or not. qp is the
quantity of energy produced by the producer p ∈P, qCimp,qCexp are respectively
import and export quantities, and αC , βC are the intercept and the slope of the
demand curve. The domestic price, for each country, is given by αC − βCQ,
where Q is the domestic quantity of energy available. Finally, piC
′
is the price at
which the country can import energy from other countries, hence the variable
linking the optimization problems of different countries. Optionally for some
countries, we introduce a carbon tax paradigm, where the tax imposed on the
followers is proportional to the emissions they cause. i.e., there is a constraint
tp = Cpemmisiont
GHG, where the government decides the tax payable per unit
emission. Furthermore, note that if b is non-zero, the objective is no longer lin-
ear. In such a case, we replace the product term with a McCormick relaxation.
Finally, tp, and piC are the tax cap and price cap respectively.
The lower level Nash game that each producer p solves is formulated as follow:
min
qp
: Cpq
p +
1
2
Dpq
p2 + tpqp −
αC − βC
∑
p′∈P
qp
′
+ qCimp − qCexp
qp

(19a)
subject to qp ≥ 0 (19b)
qp ≤ qp (19c)
The first two terms in the objective correspond to the cost incurred by the energy
producer, while the third term is the tax expense. The parenthesis results in the
revenue of p, which is the product of domestic price and the quantity produced.
Further, the producer is constrained by their capacity limits. Note that the
product of variables (tpqp) in the objective does not pose any additional difficulty
to the problem. This is because the follower’s problem is still convex quadratic
for a fixed value of tp, and the KKT conditions give complementarity constraints
with only linear terms.
Instance sets We generated two instances sets for our computations. Instance-
SetA contains 149 instances where there are 3 to 5 countries, and parameters for
these – including the ones of followers – were sampled by real-world data. In-
stanceSetB contains 50 instances with strictly 7 countries. These instances were
selected if Algorithm 1 was not able to solve them within 10 second on a single
core machine.
Results tables In what follows, we report the full results for the computational
tests. For all the above computations, we set a time limit TL = 1800 seconds,
and test on a 8-cores Intel(R) Xeon Gold 6142, with 32GB of RAM, and Gurobi
9.0. Tables 3 and 4 contains the full results for InstanceSetA and InstanceSetB,
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respectively. The first three columns are the instance number, the number of
leaders, and – for each leader – their respective number of followers in squared
parenthesis. The MNE column is the status of the instance, namely if it has an
equilibrium (YES ), if it does not (NO), or if the timelimit was triggered (TL) for
all the methods. In the remaining column, we report the clock time and the status
for each algorithmic configuration. In particular, we have Algorithm 1 (FE ),
and the inner approximations. We report three extenstion strategies, namely
the sequential (seq), the reverse sequential (rseq), and the random one (rand).
They are followed by their respective parameter k, as reported in Section 6. The
last two columns are related to PNE s.
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